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 Introduction 
 In debating the politics and ethics of immigration, it is not uncommon 
to come across a version of the “social trust argument.” The basic form 
of the argument is always the same. It contends that a political commu-
nity cannot survive without social trust, and that social trust cannot be 
achieved or maintained without a political community having discre-
tionary control over immigration. 
 Where  social trust arguments diverge from one another, however, is on 
the matter of what social trust should be based on. For example, there is a 
version of the  social trust argument that insists that social trust is (or should 
be) based on a shared race, ethnicity, or culture. According to this version 
of the argument, immigration dilutes or destabilizes social trust by intro-
ducing different races, ethnicities, or cultures into the political commu-
nity (Grant 1922). In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
this version of the  social trust argument was often used to justify notori-
ously discriminatory US immigration policies, such as the 1882 Chinese 
Exclusion Act and the “national origin” quota introduced in 1924. 
 This version of the  social trust argument has already received a lot of 
criticism, but most of objections leveled against it do not extend to more 
sophisticated versions of this argument. For example, there is another 
version of the  social trust argument that suggests that social trust is (or 
should be) based on shared institutions (e.g., welfare services, social 
programs, and public education) and not on arbitrary factors such as race 
or ethnicity. This more sophisticated version of the  social trust argument 
holds that a political community must have discretionary control over 
immigration because immigration threatens these shared institutions, 
either by undermining the faith people have in them or by straining them 
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beyond their capacity. Today, US immigration policy eschews this earlier 
bigoted version of the  social trust argument , but since the 1990s it has not 
shied away from adopting a more sophisticated version of this argument 
to justify its “enforcement first” approach to immigration reform. This 
has been the case at both the state level (Schuck 1995) and the federal 
level (1996 Illegal Immigration Reform & Immigrant Responsibility Act; 
1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act). 
 In this chapter, I offer a line of criticism directed at this more sophisti-
cated version of the  social trust argument . I begin by first explaining what 
the  social trust argument is, what some of its critics have said about it, and 
how those criticisms have not succeeded in completely refuting it. Then, 
I look at the sociohistorical circumstances of Latino/as in the United 
States. The purpose of this investigation is to expose an inherent weak-
ness of the  social trust argument : it not only fails to deliver on its promise 
of social trust, but actually promotes its opposite, social mistrust. The 
later sections then make the case that a better way of promoting social 
trust, and at the same time abating social mistrust, is to circumvent a 
political community’s ability to control immigration by giving priority 
to both sociohistorical circumstances and, at least in a minimalist sense, 
immigrant rights. If my argument is successful, it will show not only why 
the social trust argument is indefensible, but also why “enforcement first” 
approaches to immigration reform should be rejected in favor of a more 
comprehensive approach. 
 The social trust argument 
 The  social trust argument is typically presented as a consequentialist argu-
ment. 1 This means that proponents of the argument are not necessarily 
claiming that a political community is in some absolute sense entitled 
to social trust, but rather that without social trust, many unfortunate 
consequences will befall the political community. According to Shelley 
Wilcox, the  social trust argument can be articulated in one of two ways. 
First, it can be argued that newcomers are not sufficiently integrating 
into their receiving societies and therefore “ . . . embracing large numbers 
of unacculturated immigrants will disrupt the cultural conditions that 
enable citizens to act autonomously” (Wilcox 2004, 559). Or, secondly, 
it can be argued that: “ . . . the presence of ethnically diverse immigrants 
will diminish the strong sense of national solidarity that is necessary to 
sustain vital liberal democratic ideals [and institutions]” (Wilcox 2004, 
559). In either case, the result would be the same: if a political commu-
nity lacks discretionary control over immigration, then social trust, which 
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is instrumentally necessary to sustain political autonomy and/or liberal 
principles, values, and institutions, will be undermined. 
 Along similar lines, Ryan Pevnick has explained the dilemma of social 
trust in the following way. Most advocates of open borders justify their 
position by appealing to some version of moral egalitarianism, 2 which 
is a position that believes that all persons deserve equal moral consid-
eration. However, another egalitarian commitment is that institutions 
ought to provide distributive and/or redistributive justice (i.e., provide 
welfare services, social programs, and public education). According to 
Pevnick, proponents of the  social trust argument see a problem here: 
“ . . . citizens will refuse to support justice-required redistributive programs 
if such programs incorporate nationally diverse immigrants” (Pevnick 
2009, 156). If it is the case that citizens will only support institutions of 
distributive and/or redistributive justice if those institutions help only 
their fellow citizens, then “ . . . egalitarian liberals cannot have their cake 
and eat it too; instead, they must choose which commitment—increased 
immigration or redistributive programs—takes precedence and accept 
that they will have to abandon the other” (Pevnick 2009, 148). The 
point here is that there is  no inconsistency, as most open-borders advo-
cates have suggested, in justifying a political community’s discretionary 
right to control immigration from an egalitarian perspective (Pevnick 
2009, 148). 
 Neither Wilcox nor Pevnick subscribe to the  social trust argument and 
both have raised their own objections to it. Pevnick, for example, has 
argued that: “the trust on which the welfare state relies depends more 
on the shape of the institutions than on the identity of the population 
that they serve” (Pevnick 2009, 148). In other words, the social trust that 
bolsters these institutions depends less on the particular individuals who 
make up the political community, than it depends on institutions giving 
off the appearance of fairness. For example, if the individuals who benefit 
from these institutions are recognized as individuals who have contrib-
uted, or will contribute, to them, then the institutions seem to be oper-
ating as they should and people will have faith in them. 
 Going a step further, Pevnick also notes that: “ even if successful, the 
social trust argument can only provide reason to limit claims of membership . 
The social trust argument provides no reason to forbid migrants from 
entering the territory” (Pevnick 2009, 156–157 emphasis in original). In 
other words, for Pevnick, citizenship and residency are, at least analyt-
ically, two distinct things. So whatever discretion the  social trust argu-
ment might grant to political communities, that discretion is limited to 
claims of citizenship and not to claims of residency. This leaves open 
9781137503800_04_ch02.indd   39 5/22/2015   5:59:40 PM
40 José Jorge Mendoza
the possibility that while the  social trust argument might be sufficient to 
show why a political community ought to have the discretionary right 
to control citizenship, it does not show why it ought to have the same 
discretion over residency. 
 For her part, Wilcox makes the case against the  social trust argument 
from a liberal democratic point of view. According to Wilcox, in a liberal 
democracy a thick national identity (i.e., an identity that functions as 
both a political and cultural identity) will not only be unnecessary, but 
will also be undesirable and even unjustifiable. On these grounds, Wilcox 
proposes that a better, and more consistent (at least more consistent 
with liberal democracy) way of obtaining and maintaining social trust is 
through “a non-nationalist model of naturalization that would encourage 
immigrants to become integrated into liberal democratic societies by 
participating in their major economic and sociopolitical institutions and 
practices” (Wilcox 2004, 560). 
 While I am sympathetic to both of these responses and find them 
both persuasive, their applicability is restricted to cases wherein liberal 
commitments (e.g., respect for individual liberty and universal equality) 
are already in place. As it turns out, most supporters of the  social trust argu-
ment either do not harbor these commitments or at least do not prioritize 
them in the same way that liberals do. Supporters of the  social trust argu-
ment are, by and large, more nationalist and/or communitarian in their 
moral and political commitments. These commitments tend to generate 
thicker notions of citizenship, or at least thicker than what most liberals 
would be comfortable with. These thicker notions of citizenship exclude 
the possibility that residency can or ought to be delinked from citizen-
ship or that non-nationalist models of naturalization would be sufficient 
for political integration. In short, it seems that proponents of a thinker 
version of the  social trust argument could withstand the sorts of liberal 
objections being raised by Wilcox and Pevnick, by maintaining that the 
alternatives provided by Wilcox and Pevnick would not generate the kind 
of social trust that is necessary for the continued existence of the political 
community. 
 Arguably one of the most well-known proponents of this thicker 
version of the  social trust argument is Samuel P. Huntington. Huntington’s 
version of the  social trust argument can be found in his second major 
work,  Who Are We? , in which he defends the controversial claim that the 
United States is fundamentally an Anglo-Protestant nation. By Anglo-
Protestantism, Huntington has in mind a certain type of “culture,” 
which falls somewhere between an ethnicity and a civic identity. As he 
writes:
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 Hence there is no validity to the claim that Americans have to choose 
between a white, WASPish ethnic identity, on the one hand, and an 
abstract, shallow civic identity dependent on commitment to certain 
political principles, on the other. The core of their identity is the 
culture that the settlers created, which generations of immigrants have 
absorbed, and which gave birth to the American Creed. At the heart of 
that culture has been Protestantism. (Huntington 2004, 62) 
 Huntington’s central contention, which is expressed in this passage, 
is that besides being an Anglo-Protestant nation, the United States is 
also a settler nation and not a nation of immigrants. In fact, he goes 
on to argue that Americans have historically not liked immigrants and 
that they “ . . . did not celebrate their country as a ‘nation of immigrants’” 
(Huntington 2004, 38). The distinction Huntington draws between a 
settler nation and a nation of immigrants is that: “settlers leave an existing 
society . . . They are imbued with a sense of collective purpose. Implicitly 
or explicitly they subscribe to a compact or charter that defines . . . the 
community they create . . . ” (Huntington 2004, 39). Immigrants, 
according to Huntington, do not do these things because their migration 
from one society to another is a very personal process, and for that reason 
they are not interested in forming compacts (Huntington 2004, 39–40). 
Huntington uses these points to justify his claim that, in the twenty-first 
century, the biggest threat to the national unity (i.e., social trust) of the 
United States is immigration from Latin America and, in particular, from 
Mexico. As he writes:
 The continuation of high levels of Mexican and Hispanic immigration 
plus the low rates of assimilation of these immigrants into American 
society and culture could eventually change America into a country of 
two languages, two cultures, and two peoples. This will not only trans-
form America. It will also have deep consequences for Hispanics, who 
will be in America but not of it . . . There is no Americano dream. There 
is only the American dream created by an Anglo-Protestant society. 
Mexican-Americans will share in that dream and in that society only if 
they dream in English. (Huntington 2004, 256) 
 There are some serious doubts as to whether Huntington’s account is 
correct (Kaag 2008; Orosco 2008, 16–19). Nonetheless, it is his version of 
the  social trust argument that we should consider because, in contrast to 
Wilcox and Pevnick, Huntington believes that social trust requires more 
than having the right civic institutions; it also requires that individuals 
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have something akin to the right “culture.” While this argumentative 
move allows Huntington to avoid the objections raised by Wilcox and 
Pevnick, it also exemplifies for many the problem that has historically 
haunted the  social trust argument : at its core this is really an argument that 
aims at, or is driven by, racial, ethnic, or cultural animus. 
 This is a problem because, on the one hand, a sure way of fomenting 
social mistrust is by ostracizing a particular segment of the political 
community (i.e., discriminate against people based on race, ethnicity, 
nationality, sex or gender). On the other hand, if social trust requires 
the promotion of the right kind of “culture,” then a political commu-
nity should, as Huntington suggests, be free to deny entry to those (e.g., 
Mexican immigrants) whom it sees as promoting the wrong kind of 
“culture.” For example, while the United States currently has no “cultural” 
restrictions on immigration, there are many politicians who actively 
oppose immigration on grounds that certain immigrants (e.g., immi-
grants from Latin America) bring with them a kind of criminal culture 
that would undermine social trust. For example, Iowa Congressman 
Steve King has suggested: “For [every immigrant] who’s a valedictorian, 
there’s another 100 out there that—they weigh 130 pounds and they’ve 
got calves the size of cantaloupes because they’re hauling 75 pounds of 
marijuana across the desert” (Wilstein 2013). Representative King’s views 
on Latino/a immigrants are not merely reprehensible; they also breed 
mistrust of the entire Latino/a community, regardless of whether they are 
or are not citizens. 
 This is where we find the rub: promoting social trust in Huntington’s 
thicker sense allows one to avoid the criticisms of Wilcox and Pevnick, 
but it does so only at the expense of promoting immigration policies that 
breed a kind of social mistrust (i.e., ostracizing a certain segment of the 
citizenry as permanent national outsiders). 
 A cynical—although not totally unfounded—response to Huntington’s 
version of the  social trust argument is that it should not be taken seriously 
at all. This cynical response suggests that the discriminatory implications 
of his  social trust argument are not accidental or peripheral, but are a core 
part of all  social trust arguments . They claim that the  social trust argument 
is merely an attempt by nativists and xenophobes to justify (either to 
themselves or to others) their own irrational dislike of immigrants and 
have little to do with social trust. Edwina Barvosa articulates such a view 
when she states: “ . . . identity contradictions and fragmentations within 
the psyches of some, if not many, mainstream white Americans underlie 
persistent patterns of anti-immigrant hostility . . . ” (Barvosa 2012, 20). 
She goes on to say that the result of these psychic fragmentations is “ . . . a 
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political quagmire in which reason-based public deliberation is stymied 
by mass reactivity arising from the activation of constructed identity 
contradictions, unrecognized mass melancholia, residual trauma, or 
other intra-psychic fragmentations” (Barvosa 2012, 20). In other words, 
proponents of the  social trust argument are not so much trying to stake 
out a reasonable position on immigration policy; they are attempting to 
justify their own persistent patterns of racial, ethnic, or cultural resent-
ment. Therefore, Barvosa would claim, it is no wonder that a position 
like Huntington’s suffers from a contradiction, of attempting to promote 
social trust in a way that is sure to foment social mistrust, because it is 
based on an irrational hatred and not on a rational evaluation of immi-
gration policy. 
 An analysis like Barvosa’s is helpful in both exposing and explaining 
the discriminatory potential of a Huntington’s version of the  social trust 
argument . That said a more philosophically sophisticated version of the 
 social trust argument might still be able to avoid these irrationalities and 
thereby survive a Barvosa-style critique. For example, some proponents 
of the  social trust argument , like David Miller, have recognized the discrim-
inatory potential of the  social trust argument and have tried to immu-
nize their own position against these noxious entailments. Miller, like 
Huntington, believes that maintaining a political community (even, and 
especially, a liberal state) will “require a common public culture that in 
part constitutes the political identity of their members” (Miller 2005, 
199). Unlike Huntington, however, Miller explicitly rejects the possibility 
that a political community can use such things as race, ethnicity, sex or 
gender as criteria for exclusion because: “to be told that they belong to 
the wrong race, or sex . . . is insulting, given that these features do not 
connect to anything of real significance to the society [potential immi-
grants] want to join” (Miller 2005, 204). 
 Assuming for the moment that something like Miller’s anti-discrimi-
natory addendum would allow for a version of the  social trust argument 
that can (a) skirt the initial criticisms of Wilcox and Pevnick and (b) avoid 
the discriminatory potential that makes Huntington’s version so repul-
sive, would this be sufficient to salvage the argument? At first glance it 
seems that this might do the trick. After all, if admissions and exclusions 
criteria are nondiscriminatory and treat everyone equally, how could 
they possibly be the source of social mistrust? 
 The remainder of this chapter will make the case that, even if propo-
nents of the  social trust argument come to adopt something like Miller’s 
addendum, the argument is still not salvageable. Its two conflicting 
components (viz., a political community’s discretionary control over 
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immigration and the need for social trust) remain at odds with each 
other. So while it is true that social trust depends largely on how a polit-
ical community deals with immigration, proponents of the  social trust 
argument have either misidentified or overlooked an important source of 
social mistrust. In the next section I will shed some light on this source by 
briefly exploring the case of Latino/as in the United States. 
 The curious case of Latino/as in the United States 
 This section outlines some of the key flashpoints in US immigration policy 
and how they have affected the Latino/a community. Understanding the 
historical relationship between the Latino/a community and US immi-
gration policy is important because it exemplifies the two claims that 
this chapter is attempting to establish: (1) the  social trust argument , even 
when it adopts something like Miller’s addendum, still fails to provide 
social trust, and (2) avoiding social mistrust necessitates that the control 
a political community has over immigration be circumvented and not 
discretionary. 
 Most historians would probably concede that US immigration law and 
policy reached its discriminatory zenith in the early part of twentieth 
century. By 1900 the Chinese Exclusion Acts were not only the law of 
the land, but they had survived various Supreme Court challenges (see 
Chinese Exclusion Act 1882; Chae Chan Ping v. United States 1889; Fong 
Yue Ting v. United States 1893). In 1917 this race-based form of exclu-
sion was further expanded to include most of Asia, which subsequently 
came to be known as the “Asiatic barred zone” (1917 Immigration Act). 
Then, in 1924, the Johnson-Reed Act barred from entry all immigrants 
who were ineligible for US citizenship and also introduced a system of 
“national origin” quotas (1924 Immigration Act). 
 The provisions of the 1924 Act were perniciously discriminatory in 
two ways. First, they made most nonwhite persons ineligible to enter 
the United States because, as far back as the 1790, naturalized US citizen-
ship had already been restricted to “white persons” (1790 Naturalization 
Act). After the 1924 Act went into effect, nonwhite persons were not only 
barred from obtaining US citizenship, but were also denied admission 
into the United States. Second, the “national origin” quota did not apply 
equally to all nations. The quota was intended to reflect the true compo-
sition of the United States, and based on this mandate Congress felt justi-
fied in using the 1890 census, which took place just before a large wave of 
immigrants from eastern and southern Europe came to the United States, 
to determine the quota numbers. Not surprisingly, the 1924 Act allocated 
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higher quota numbers to northern Europeans and very few to eastern or 
southern Europeans (Ngai, 2004, 23). 
 Interestingly enough, these overtly discriminatory laws and policies 
did not place any restrictions on countries from the Western hemisphere, 
which made Latino/a immigrants different from other immigrants. At a 
time when nonwhite persons were routinely being denied membership 
and entry into the United States, Mexican nationals were not only being 
allowed to enter the United States, but in many cases were even eligible 
for US citizenship (De Leon 1979). 
 This is not to say that at the turn of the twentieth century Latino/
as in the United States did not face social ostracism and discrimination. 
Despite their eligibility to enter and become US citizens, the nonwhite, 
non-northern European status of people with Mexican ancestry still 
branded them as national outsiders and even subjected them to unjust 
forms of deportation (see Johnson 2005) and even violence (see Delgado 
2009). The larger point, however, still seems to hold: at the turn of the 
twentieth century, the social positioning of Latino/as in the United States 
was not necessarily worse and in some cases (e.g., with respect to immi-
gration and citizenship eligibility) might have been better than that faced 
by other similarly situated ethnic groups we now consider “white” (e.g., 
Irish, Italian, Poles, and Jews). 
 Beginning in 1943, with the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act 
(Magnuson Act 1943), and culminating in 1965, when the “national 
origins” quota was replaced with a system of numerical caps (1965 
Immigration and Nationality Act), the more noxious (i.e., Huntington-
like) aspects of US immigration policy were supposed to have come to 
an end. Admissions and exclusions criteria were no longer supposed 
to be discriminatory (thereby satisfying Miller’s anti-discriminatory 
addendum), so it should have been the case that they would not generate 
the type of social mistrust that is commonly associated with xenophobic 
immigration laws and policies. 
 For members of the aforementioned “white” ethnic groups this was in 
fact the case. As the United States came to embrace a “nation of immi-
grants” narrative, “white” ethnic groups were able to obtain national 
insider status (see Gabaccia 2010). Interestingly enough, however, these 
same anti-discriminatory immigration reforms seemed to have the 
opposite effect on the Latino/a community. Post-1965, the association 
of Latino/as with being national outsiders gained in strength (see De 
Genova 2004). This presents us with a strange turn of events. Where, at 
the turn of the twentieth century, Mexican nationality could provide a 
noncitizen with at least some reprieve from the discriminatory nature of 
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US immigration controls, now, at the start of the twenty-first century, we 
have a situation where a hint of Latin American ancestry is sufficient to 
arouse suspicion of one’s civic standing and thereby view them as a threat 
to national unity (i.e., a threat to social trust). 
 So what explains the deteriorating social standing of the Latino/as in 
the United States, especially during a time when similarly situated ethnic 
groups saw their standing drastically improve? One could make the argu-
ment that the reason today’s “white” ethnic groups (e.g., people of Irish, 
Italian, Polish, and Jewish descent) were able to gain a kind of national 
insider status while other groups (e.g., people of Asian and Latin American 
descent) were not was because of the way “whiteness” functions. On this 
view, ethnic groups that are today considered “white” in the United States 
were not fully white before 1965. Prior to 1965, their status was some-
where between “white” and nonwhite. However, those ethnic groups that 
are today considered nonwhite (e.g., Asian-Americans and Latino/as) are 
groups that have always unambiguously fallen on the nonwhite side of 
this divide. This view goes on to claim that, while various factors played 
a role in transforming those in the “in-between” category to full “white” 
status, the aforementioned immigration reforms played a primary role in 
making this transformation possible (see Roediger 2006). 
 The strength of such an account is that it helps to explain why certain 
groups, for example Asian-Americans, did not suddenly gain social accept-
ance, even as the immigration restrictions that most directly affected 
them were being lifted. On this account, the ethnic groups that gained 
national insider status were those, and only those, who could potentially 
fall on the “white” side of this divide. Ethnic groups that did not have 
this same “in-between” status therefore could not benefit from changes 
to immigration law and thereby remained firmly entrenched on the 
nonwhite side of this divide. 
 The problem for an account like this, however, is explaining the curious 
case of Latino/as. If, at the turn of the twentieth century, there were an 
ethnic group in the United States that could be considered “in-between,” 
it would likely have to have been Latino/as. When Irish, Italian, Polish, 
and Jewish immigrants were finding it difficult even to enter the United 
States, Latino/as were not only permitted to enter, but also had US courts 
recognize their eligibility for citizenship. So why, post-1965, did Latino/
as not also come to enjoy a national insider status as many of today’s 
“white” ethnic groups do? Appeals to a lack of “whiteness” seem only to 
beg the question. 
 A more plausible explanation seems to be that, while these reforms 
treated all immigrants formally equal, they still left immigration control 
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(specifically the enforcement of immigration laws) at the discretion of 
the political community, in this case at the discretion of the US federal 
government. If nondiscriminatory admission and exclusion policies were, 
by themselves, sufficient to neutralize their discriminatory potential, it 
stands to reason that post-1965 United States this is what we would have 
seen. Instead, as we see with the case of Latino/as, these reforms failed to 
ameliorate social mistrust. This suggests that Miller’s addendum, while 
well intentioned, is still insufficient. 
 Nativists, such as Huntington, would argue that Miller’s addendum 
fails to deliver on the promise of social trust because it gives the polit-
ical community less, rather than more, discretion in the admission 
and exclusion of nonmembers. Miller’s addendum, on their view, only 
handcuffs the political community in its attempts to foster the right 
“culture” (e.g., Anglo-Protestantism), which for them is essential to 
social trust. Therefore, from their perspective, it is not surprising that 
anti- discriminatory immigration reforms did not lead to social trust nor 
ameliorate social mistrust. 
 My position is that thinkers like Huntington are correct when they say 
that the national outsider status of groups like Latino/as in the United 
States is a threat to social trust and that political communities should 
address this. They are wrong, however, in believing that the solution 
to this problem is to give the political community more, rather than 
less, discretion in controlling immigration. The national outsider status 
that Latino/as are currently saddled with is not an essential feature of 
 Latino/ a-ness (as Huntington contends). This outsider status is the result 
of various factors, not the least of which is an immigration policy that 
did not sufficiently take into account sociohistorical circumstances or 
respect, even in a minimalist sense, immigrant rights. 
 The next two sections will therefore attempt to do two things: (1) explain 
what is meant by “sociohistorical circumstances” and “immigrant rights,” 
and (2) suggest that an immigration policy that respects both of these is 
essential in developing social trust and ameliorating social mistrust. This 
is the critical point of the argument. If the promotion of social trust and 
the amelioration of social mistrust require that a political community’s 
immigration policy adhere to these conditions, then the political commu-
nity has, at best, a circumscribed—not discretionary—right to control 
immigration. In practical terms, this means that the “enforcement first” 
approach to immigration reform, which the United States has favored in 
recent years, might in fact be self-defeating and that a return to compre-
hensive approaches, especially those that mirror the recommendations 
made in the following two sections, should be adopted instead. 
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 Sociohistorical circumstances and social trust 
 The phrase “sociohistorical circumstances” is here used to mean the way 
the world really is, its real history, real international and global relations, 
and real material circumstances. This is obviously a very broad defini-
tion, but with regard to immigration the focus can be narrowed to the 
history, relations, and material circumstances that political communities 
have (or have had) with each other and with the individual members of 
each other’s communities. Under this, admittedly broad, understanding 
of sociohistorical circumstances, we can see how adhering to them could 
take away some of the discretion that a political community has in 
controlling immigration. 
 For example, if we return to the case of the United States, we can see 
that, despite all the immigration reforms that were passed after 1943, the 
number of undocumented immigrants, specifically undocumented immi-
grants from Mexico, actually went up. The cause of this sudden increase 
could be attributed to various factors, but unquestionably a principle 
cause was the 1965 policy of numerical caps. These numerical caps placed 
a 20,000 persons per year cap on all nations, thereby treating all coun-
tries the same and removing the last reminisce of overtly discriminatory 
immigration restrictions. As already mentioned, however, before 1965 
the United States had no limits on people migrating from the Western 
hemisphere. So, as Mae Ngai nicely summarizes:
 The imposition of a 20,000 annual quota on Mexico recast Mexican 
migration as “illegal.” When one considers that in the early 1960s 
annual “legal” Mexican migration comprised some 200,000 braceros 
and 35,000 regular admissions for permanent residency, the transfer of 
migration to “illegal” form should have surprised no one. The number 
of deportations of undocumented Mexicans increased by 40 percent in 
1968 to 151,000 . . . [by 1976] the INS expelled 781,000 Mexicans from 
the United States. Meanwhile, the total number of apprehensions 
for all others in the world,  combined , remained below 100,000 a year 
(Ngai 2004, 261). In short, because of these numerical caps Latino/
as suddenly came to comprise a disproportionately large segment of 
the undocumented immigrant population, even though their actual 
numbers hardly changed. 
 So, similar to the way racial profiling assumes that nonwhites are 
criminals until they are proven innocent, since the late 1960s Latino/as 
in the United States have been assumed to be unlawfully present until 
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their lawful status can be confirmed. While this is a fallacious way of 
reasoning—thinking that because Latino/as make up a disproportionate 
segment of the undocumented immigrant population, that therefore 
Latino/a identity is somehow a good marker of unlawful presence (i.e., 
affirming the consequent)—it is nonetheless an inference and association 
that is made in the United States and it is especially made by enforcement 
officers (see United States v. Brignoni-Ponce 1975 and United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte 1976). 
 It should be obvious why this type of profiling is pernicious, even if it 
does result in better and more efficient enforcement of current immigra-
tion laws. It is pernicious because it breeds social mistrust among citi-
zens, as most Latino/as in the United States are actually citizens, and 
constantly suspecting them of being improperly present puts their citi-
zenship into doubt. 3 To end or prevent these types of pernicious asso-
ciations from forming, one of two things needs to happen. First, a way 
needs to be developed so that no one particular group within the larger 
political community comes to make up a disproportionate segment of 
the undocumented immigrant population. If this is done correctly, then 
these pernicious kinds of associations should never get off the ground. 
Alternatively, and likely in conjunction with the former, proactive meas-
ures need to be taken so that particular groups are not only not stigma-
tized by immigration law, but also not stigmatized in the  enforcement of 
those laws. The way to address the former has to do with adhering to 
sociohistorical circumstances, so it will be the subject of the remainder of 
this section. The latter has more to do with immigrant rights, so it will be 
the subject of the section that follows. 
 If we recall, one of the problems with the post-1943 US immigration 
reforms was that they failed to adequately account for the 200,000+ 
annual migrants from Mexico. This failure served as a catalyst for the 
sudden increase in undocumented immigrants from Mexico because, 
even though the United States changed its immigration policy, its need 
for Mexican immigrant labor in the mid-1960s had not changed. The vast 
majority of Mexican immigrants, who were both needed by US employers 
and needed the jobs those employers offered, simply went from being 
legal migrants to being undocumented workers. This shift in the legal 
status of migrant workers is in large part what has led to the strong iden-
tification of Latino/as with being national outsiders (see De Genova 
2004 and Chomsky 2014). Within the United States this identification 
has led to an increase, as opposed to a decrease, in the social mistrust of 
Latino/as. For example, Latino/as have come to be seen as unfairly using 
or straining beyond capacity the welfare services, social programs and 
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public education of the United States, and this mistrust has served as the 
motivation for recent anti-immigrant state reforms, such as California’s 
proposition 187, that prioritize enforcement by denying benefits to immi-
grants, but where the real target of the proposed law is the entire Latino/a 
community (Schuck 1995). 
 Therefore, if social trust—and not merely an immigrant-free environ-
ment—is the goal, then future US immigration reforms should have 
adhered to sociohistorical circumstances. For example, if it is a fact of 
the world that the US economy needs and will continue to draw immi-
grant labor from certain parts of the world (either because of its historical 
or geographical connections to this area or for other reasons), then US 
immigration policies ought to reflect this. The same can also be said about 
family relationships. This does not, however, entail that the United States 
must completely open its border. All it means is that if it seeks to reduce 
the number of undocumented immigrants in its territory, because large 
numbers of undocumented immigrants have the potential of fomenting 
social mistrust, then admissions policies need to take into account socio-
historical circumstances. 
 Social trust requires immigrant rights 
 Having immigration policies adhere to sociohistorical circumstances 
might limit a political community’s ability to exclude immigrants, but 
it does not necessarily bring the  social trust argument to an end. The fatal 
blow comes in the form of immigrant rights, especially if by immigrant 
rights we mean presumptive protections that limit a political commu-
nity’s right to expel noncitizens. If it turns out that these sorts of protec-
tions are necessary, even at a minimal level, to obtain social trust (or at 
least to not further foment social mistrust), then the  social trust argument 
has been defeated. The difficulty, however, is in showing that proponents 
of the  social trust argument are bound to accept such protections based on 
their own moral or political commitments. 
 As we already saw in the possible replies to Wilcox and Pevnick, propo-
nents of the  social trust argument tend to be more nationalist or communi-
tarian in their moral and political commitments. This means that, unlike 
liberal cosmopolitans, they believe that there are some meaningful (i.e., 
moral or political) differences between citizens and noncitizens. For them, 
these differences make the denial of immigrant rights seem almost like 
common sense. After all, immigrants are not, or at least are not initially, 
citizens of the political community and therefore are not owed the same 
political, and maybe not even the same moral, consideration that is owed 
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to other fellow citizens. So, even if citizens have the right to enter and 
remain within their own political community, as most nationalists and 
communitarians conceded that they do, immigrants are not owed the 
same courtesy. At best, immigrants might be granted the privilege to 
enter or remain within a political community, but that is at the discre-
tion of that political community. 
 In this section, I challenge this conclusion by suggesting that social 
trust requires that a political community offer protections against overly 
intrusive immigration enforcement and that in order for these protec-
tions to be effective they also must extend to immigrants as well. The 
argument for this is as follows. While the  social trust argument does not 
require a commitment to universal moral or political equality, it does 
demand respect for the moral and political equality of citizens. As we 
have already seen, a failure to respect the moral and political equality 
of citizens can relegate certain citizens to a kind of second-class status, 
which in turn undermines social trust. In short, there is no surer way of 
sowing the seeds of social mistrust than by undermining the moral or 
political equality of citizens. 
 There are many ways that the moral and political equality of citizens 
can be undermined, but as mentioned already, one sure way of doing so 
is to allow a certain group of citizens to bear a disproportionate amount 
of the burdens associated with enforcement. For example, if law enforce-
ment agents disproportionately target nonwhite persons because they 
believe there is a strong link between being nonwhite and committing 
crime, then, regardless of how law enforcement agents might have come 
to make that association, the moral and political worth of nonwhite citi-
zens has been undermined. These sorts of associations are therefore a 
source of social mistrust (specifically between white and nonwhite citi-
zens). This means that if the end goal is social trust, then practices like 
racial profiling ought to be prohibited, even when prohibiting these prac-
tices might make law enforcement and crime fighting more difficult and 
less efficient. 
 Prohibiting these sorts of enforcement practices does not necessarily 
entail that laws cannot be enforced or that criminal activity must be toler-
ated. All that the preceding argument establishes is that, for the sake of 
social trust, the amount of discretion a political community has in enfor-
cing its laws must be circumvented by what we might call an  equality of 
burdens standard: whatever burdens result from the enforcement of laws, 
social trust requires that these burdens be allocated as equally as possible 
among all citizens, so that no citizen or group of citizens are given less 
moral or political consideration. As far as implications for immigration 
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policy, the  equality of burdens standard would merely ask for the nondis-
criminatory element that is already present in US admissions and exclu-
sions policy to be extended to the enforcement of these policies. This 
seems like a reasonable recommendation for any future immigration 
reform to adopt. 
 If this policy recommendation were to be adopted in some future 
immigration reform, its implementation would see to it that any person, 
neighborhood or workplace be as likely as any other to be investigated, 
and in a similar manner, by immigration enforcement agencies. The 
reasoning behind this is that if only certain persons, jobs or neighbor-
hoods are subject to enforcement or disproportionate enforcement, then 
the citizens who happen to be, live or work in those neighborhoods or 
perform those particular sorts of jobs will have been given less moral and 
political consideration than citizens who do not. 
 But while meeting an  equality of burdens standard might be necessary 
for social trust, it is not sufficient without also having a corresponding 
commitment to  universal protections . Another key component of social 
trust is that citizens have faith in their political institutions. If political 
institutions are corrupt or despotic, then, even if all the burdens (e.g., 
abuses) are equally shared, citizens will only be fulfilling their civic obli-
gations out of fear rather than out of trust. This potential for corruption 
and despotism suggests that a further standard must be met in order to 
generate or maintain social trust. This standard will insure social trust by 
making transparent and limiting the coercive powers of political institu-
tions. To meet this standard a political community does not necessarily 
need to be prohibited from deploying coercive force, but there must be 
some mechanisms in place for oversight and restrictions on excessive 
use when it does deploy force. We can call this the  universal protections 
standard. 
 As a policy recommendation, it is difficult to say what specific types 
of oversight or restrictions would be necessary in order to adequately 
meet this standard, as different communities will have their own unique 
situation and set of challenges, but there does seem to be at least one 
universal restriction that this standard should will entail. There must 
at least be a “presumption of innocence” restriction. This means that 
all persons should be assumed to be, and treated as though they were, 
innocent until their guilt has been definitively proven. The justifica-
tion for this seems obvious; if institutions are allowed to treat citizens as 
though they are guilty before they have been proven guilty, then there 
will be little trust, and in fact a whole lot of mistrust, in and within these 
institutions. 
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 This means that if a future immigration reform were to adopt some-
thing like a  universal protections standard, a political community would 
have to treat all persons present as though they were lawfully present 
until their status is proven to be irregular. In more concrete terms, if US 
immigration policy had to adhere to something like a  universal protections 
standard, it would need to give all persons present, regardless of their 
immigration status, such basic protections as the right to due process, 
equal protection under the law, freedom from unreasonable searches and 
seizures, and a right to an attorney, which is currently not the case in 
removal proceedings. 4 Protections like these are essential because without 
them immigration controls could easily infringe on the rights of citizens. 5 
So again, the control a political community has over immigration should 
be circumvented, not for the sake of noncitizens, but for the sake of not 
fomenting social mistrust among fellow citizens. 6 
 If the two aforementioned standards ( equality of burdens and  universal 
protections ) were to become part of an immigration policy, they would 
form a canopy that protects citizens from the excesses of a political 
community’s enforcement mechanisms and in this regard would be essen-
tial to the effort of promoting and maintaining social trust. However, 
one of the consequences of adhering to these standards would be that a 
political community would lose much of its discretionary control over 
immigration enforcement. For example, a political community would 
not, without violating the  equality of burdens standard, be able to target 
certain persons, communities, or occupations with more enforcement, 
even when it believes that these persons, communities, or occupations 
are more likely than others to harbor undocumented immigrants. In more 
concrete terms, this would prohibit raids such as the infamous Postville 
Raid, which at the time was the largest immigration raid in US history. 
This raid on a meatpacking plant in Postville, Iowa netted close to 400 
undocumented immigrants and in its aftermath close to 1,000 Latino/
as—both citizen and immigrant alike—left Postville (Yu-Hsi Lee 2013). 7 
 A political community would also be prohibited from commandeering 
police officers for immigration enforcement activities, which in the 
United States is currently a favored enforcement tactic. 8 The  universal 
protections standard either would prohibit this because of the potential for 
police abuse (e.g., police could use immigration enforcement duties as an 
excuse to target people they would otherwise have no excuse to target), 
because it might make some citizens less likely to come forward to report 
crimes (e.g., citizens who are the victims of crimes and also happen to 
live in a household where someone is undocumented might be hesitant 
to call police) or would make some persons less likely to come forward as 
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witnesses or whistleblowers (e.g., the safety of all citizens and the preser-
vation of law and order are dependent on the cooperation of all persons 
present, regardless of their immigration status). 
 Now, even if there is disagreement over the details of the two standards 
I have proposed in this section, the more general point about future immi-
gration reform still seems salient:  maintaining moral and political equality 
among citizens is a key component of social trust, and this equality is put in 
jeopardy if certain presumptive checks are not placed on a political commu-
nity’s ability to enforce immigration . These checks, while not necessarily 
entitlements, do provide immigrants with a minimal set of presumptive 
protections (i.e., immigrant rights in the “negative” sense of rights) that 
circumvent the discretion a political community enjoys in controlling 
immigration. This, again, with regard to immigration reform means that 
increasing enforcement is not a solution. In order for immigration reform 
to be successful, at least with respect to developing and maintaining social 
trust, it must make some accommodations for immigrant rights, even if 
only in a minimalist sense. 
 Conclusion 
 As mentioned in the first section of this chapter, the  social trust argument 
maintains that a political community cannot survive without social trust, 
and that social trust cannot be achieved or maintained without a political 
community having discretionary control over immigration. However, as 
the previous two sections have argued, promoting social trust (or at least 
abating social mistrust) requires that a political community’s immigration 
policy adhere to sociohistorical circumstances and, at least in a minimalist 
sense, respect immigrant rights. This critique of the  social trust argument is 
substantially different from prior criticisms that have focused their efforts 
on developing alternative ways (i.e., resorting to liberal democratic princi-
ples or institutions) for keeping the political community together. 
 While remaining sympathetic to these prior criticisms, this chapter 
challenged the key assumption of the  social trust argument : that discre-
tionary control over immigration can be consistent with a political 
community achieving or maintaining social trust. If successful, the argu-
ments presented in this chapter not only have undermined the  social trust 
argument , but more importantly have shown why “enforcement first” 
approaches to immigration reform are, and inevitably will be, unsuc-
cessful. As the case of Latino/as in the United States has shown, social 
mistrust can arise even in cases where discretionary immigration policy is 
not motivated by prejudice and even when its intended aim is to rectify 
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past injustices. In order to help generate or maintain social trust, adhering 
to sociohistorical circumstances and respecting immigrant rights must 
play a more central role in future immigration reforms. 
 Notes 
 1 .  In this regard, the  social trust argument is substantially different from deontological 
arguments, which defend the claim that “legitimate” states are morally enti-
tled to self-determination, and that a central component of self- determination 
includes the right  not to associate with nonmembers. One such example can be 
found in the work of Christopher Heath Wellman (see Wellman 2008). 
 2 .  For example, Joseph H. Carens and Phillip Cole have made such arguments 
(see Carens 1997; Cole 2000). 
 3 .  James W. Boettcher makes a similar argument, but from the perspective of 
democratic theory (Boettcher 2013). 
 4 .  Under the “Plenary Power Doctrine” the US federal government is free to 
deport noncitizens without judicial review and because deportation is not 
considered a punishment, noncitizens also do not have recourse to many 
important constitutional protections, such as the right to due process, equal 
protection under the law or the right to have an attorney appointed to them 
if they cannot afford one while in “removal proceedings” (see Senh 2009; 
Kanstroom 2007, 16–17). 
 5 .  This is an important point to keep in mind because US immigration enforce-
ment has wrongfully deported some of its own citizens and people who were 
otherwise eligible to remain in the country. In one case, the US citizen wrongly 
deported was a developmentally handicapped man, whose return trip home 
was traumatic and very easily could have ended in tragedy (see Powers 2007). 
A different case did end in tragedy when a wrongly deported man died in a 
fire inside the Honduran jail where the Honduran immigration agency was 
holding him (see Guidi 2012). 
 6 .  This argument is largely a readaptation of an argument put forth by Michael 
Blake (see Blake 2003, 224–237). 
 7 .  Not all of the Latino/as who left Postville necessarily left the country. This raid 
can therefore be seen as an example of what Elizabeth Jamison in  chapter 7 of 
this volume refers to as State-based Internal Displacement (Jamison 2015). 
 8 .  US federal law currently allows for local law enforcement to be commandeered 
for immigration enforcement duties under section 287 (g) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (1996 Illegal Immigration Reform & Immigrant 
Responsibility Act). Also, this linking up of immigration enforcement with 
local law enforcement has appeared in various state immigration bills. The 
most notorious of these being Arizona’s SB 1070 (see State of Arizona Senate). 
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